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Abstract
This paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems
when banking supervision is a national task. We focus on the choice between allow-
ing net settlement or imposing real-time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the
communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national
supervisors’ incentives are not perfectly aligned when deciding upon the settlement
method. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leav-
ing access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior
information about the risk of their foreign counterparty in the settlement system.
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The last decades have witnessed a substantial increase in the volume of transactions that are
processed via large-value payment systems. In the US, for example, the combined volume
processed via CHIPS and Fedwire exceeded US $ 2.5 trillion per day in 1998. This trend
is both a result of technological change and of increased …nancial activity. Because of the
high volumes transferred and the large size of the individual payments (the average payment
size in Fedwire was US $ 3.3 million), payment systems have grown to be one of the most
likely channels through which …nancial crises could propagate.1 Internationally, the growing
integration of …nancial markets has led to a rapid increase in cross-border transactions, and
raises fears that crises in di¤erent parts of the world could a¤ect …nancial stability. The
design of large-value payment systems, both on a domestic and on an international level, is
thus of growing concern for system participants and …nancial regulators. For example, the
G-10 countries established working committees in order to develop standards for interbank
payment systems.2
Large-value payment systems can generally be classi…ed into two types: gross systems,
now usually operating in real time, and netting systems. In Real-Time-Gross-Settlement
systems (RTGS), all transfers made between participating banks are cleared and settled im-
mediately and irrevocably. The failure by one bank does therefore not a¤ect the other banks
through the payment system. In net settlement systems, on the other hand, payments are
cleared only at pre-speci…ed settlement times, and only the net amounts of liabilities are
actually transferred. Net systems are cheaper in operation, because the amount of reserves
needed to settle is far lower than in RTGS systems. However, if a bank is unable to settle
at the end of the day, its failure can have severe consequences for the other participants,
as large amounts of expected payments will not be received. Clearly, there is a trade-o¤ in
e¢ciency between the two systems: if the failure of banks is relatively likely, a RTGS system
is the better choice. On the other hand, if the banks are quite safe, and the opportunity cost
of holding reserves is high, a netting system is more attractive. This basic trade-o¤ between
net and gross settlement systems has been analyzed by Freixas and Parigi (1998).3
RTGS and net settlement systems frequently coexist. In the European Union, for exam-
ple, the EU member states have introduced TARGET, a cross-border RTGS system. Parallel
to TARGET, privately organized net and hybrid settlement systems are operational (such
as Euro-1, operated by the European Banking Association). In the US, the Federal Reserve
Banks operate Fedwire, which is a RTGS system, while CHIPS is a privately run net settle-
ment system.
In this paper, we study access regulation to coexisting net settlement and RTGS systems
1Statistics concerning the transfers in Fedwire and Chips can be found on the web page of Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/fedpoint.
2Results of this work are the Angell Report (1989), the Lamfalussy Report (1990), and the Noël Report
(1993).
3An overview on the functioning of large value payment systems and a discussion of the risks involved
can be found in Summers (1991).
2in an international environment. We look at a situation where banks of di¤erent nationali-
ties settle their transfers through the payment system and consider the problem of deciding
whether the banks should be allowed to use the net system. Usually, a single authority, na-
tional or supranational, regulates the organization of a settlement system and ensures that
certain standards are met. The supervision of the participating banks, on the other hand, is
divided among the home-country authorities. We argue that the division of the supervisory
and regulatory power creates incentive problems in access regulation, because the national
supervisors might have somewhat con‡icting interests. Our original motivation for studying
this problem were the European cross-border settlement systems. However, the issues that
we study here also arise in domestic payments systems in which foreign banks participate,
since the local branches of foreign banks are mostly supervised by the authority in the home
country rather than in the host country.
We analyze an economy with two countries, where consumers make and receive cross-
border transfers. In each country there is one commercial, pro…t-maximizing bank. The
existence of banks is justi…ed on two grounds: …rstly, they are able to invest in pro…table,
long-run technologies, which short-lived consumers could not do. Secondly, banks are partici-
pating in an international payment system, enabling its customers to make transfers abroad.
Banking supervision is the task of the local supervisor, who maximizes its own country’s
welfare. We assume that the local supervisor can observe the risk of the local but not the
risk of the foreign bank. Concerning the private bank’s information, we study two di¤erent
scenarios. In the …rst, we assume that private banks have the same information as the su-
pervisors. It seems plausible that a bank operating internationally is better informed about
the risk of their foreign counterparties than the local supervisor, so as a second scenario we
assume that private banks can perfectly observe each other’s type.
In the economy a net and a gross settlement system are in operation. While banks have
free access to the RTGS system, access to the net system is regulated. We abstract from
explicitly modelling a supranational regulator. Instead, we assume that the local supervisors
jointly decide upon the banks’ access to the net settlement system. Due to the division of su-
pervisory powers between countries, the supervisors have to rely on each other’s information
when regulating access to settlement systems. We model the communication between the
supervisors explicitly. It is shown that the supervisors have incentives to understate the risk
of the local bank, because the foreign economy carries some of the costs of failure in a net
settlement system. Therefore, the national supervisors allow too risky banks into the netting
system. On the other hand, the private banks face limited liability, which induces them to
choose net settlement too often as well. Systemic risk is therefore higher than desirable both
when the public and the private sector decide upon access to the netting system. We …nd
that if the private banks have the same information as the supervisors, the decision about
the mode of settlement should be made by the supervisors. However, if the private banks
possess superior information about the foreign banks’ risks, it can be e¢cient to leave this
decision to the private banks.
The literature on large-value payment systems is relatively small, but there are some
3papers that deal with issues related to ours. The coexistence of net settlement and RTGS
system is discussed in Rochet and Tirole (1996). Giannini and Monticelli (1995) point out
that privately organized netting systems might undermine the European System of Cen-
tral Banks’ objectives of reducing systemic risk. Other authors (e.g., Giovannini (1992)
and Schoenmaker (1995)) have studied problems concerning the division of banking super-
visory powers within the European Union. To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper that
provides a formal analysis of the regulation of international payment systems. As a novel
feature, we take the division of supervisory powers among countries explicitly into account
and endogenize the communication between the national supervisors. In the modelling of
the communication, we draw on previous work by, in particular, Crawford and Sobel (1982)
and Melumad and Shibano (1991).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is described. Section 3 discusses
the e¤ects of gross and net settlement on the banks’ portfolio choice and on systemic stability.
In section 4, we analyze the access conditions to the net system imposed by the public
regulators. This is done …rst under the assumption that each regulator can observe both
banks’ types, and then assuming local supervision. The private banks’ access criteria are
derived in section 5, and the e¢ciency of private and public solutions are compared. Some
extensions of the model are discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes. All proofs
are in the appendix.
2. The Model
The Economy We consider an OLG model with two countries and three periods. There
are two generations of customers, who are born either at time 0 (customers ”A”) or at time
1 (customers ”B”). They live for 2 periods each. Customers are endowed with one unit of
money. During the …rst period of their lives, they wish to make payments to customers in
the other country; e.g., for purchasing goods. The size of the payments that the customers
want to make is taken to be …xed and equal to t. The customers wish to consume only in
the second period of their lives and they are risk-neutral.
In each country, there is one bank. At time 0, the banks collect deposits from the local
customers of generation A. These deposits can be invested both in central bank reserves,
yielding zero interest, and in a risky country-speci…c technology with a positive expected
return. After depositing, customers A can use their deposits to make payments to customers
of the other bank. At time 1, customers A withdraw their money, and customers B deposit.
The bank can thus use the newly deposited funds to pay parts of its obligation to customers
A. All customers demand a non-negative expected return on their deposits.
At time 2, the risky technology yields a return of R, if successful, and 0 otherwise.
The probability of failure of Country i’s risky technology is denoted e qi. In order to have
asymmetric information about the riskiness of the local bank, we assume that e qi is a random
variable. For simplicity, it is assumed that e qi is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The
realization of e qi is denoted qi (qi is also called the bank’s ”type”). At time 1, the risky
4technology can be liquidated prematurely. Liquidation is costly, and the risky technology
only pays L, 0 < L < 1, if successful, and 0 if unsuccessful.
Payment Systems A customer in country i can make payments to a customer in coun-
try j by transferring funds from his account at bank i to the receiver’s account at bank j.
Transfers between banks are made via a payment system.
Payments can be settled either in a gross or in a net settlement system. The gross
settlement system operates on a real-time basis, where payments are settled and cleared im-
mediately and irrevocably (RTGS). Gross settlement requires the banks to hold central bank
reserves equal to the amount that will be transferred to the other bank. (We assume that
there are no overdraft facilities.) Since the total transfers made every period are constant
and equal to t, banks have to hold t reserves in each period. In a net settlement system,
incoming and outgoing payments are cleared at the end of the day, and only the net liabilities
are transferred. The banks send and receive transfers of t. As long as there is no failure, no
reserves are needed in order to settle.
We assume that a gross and a net settlement system are already in operation. The
two banks can only use the net settlement system if they both agree to participate in it;
i.e. one party cannot unilaterally send payments through a netting system. Moreover, net
settlement has to be approved by the supervisors. Transfers are therefore only netted out if
both supervisors and private banks agree upon it.
The Bankruptcy Rule We need to de…ne a bankruptcy rule that determines the payment
obligations of the two netting partners in the case that one of them defaults. We assume that
banks are always obliged to ful…ll their settlement obligations to the other bank, regardless
of whether the counterparty has declared bankruptcy or not.4 We furthermore assume that
depositors’ claims on a bank’s assets are senior to claims from the other bank. If a bank
is not able to ful…ll its payment obligations to either the depositors or to the other bank,
it has to declare bankruptcy. These rules imply: (1) a failure of a bank’s risky technology
leads to bankruptcy of this bank, and (2) in the netting system, the other bank (if it itself
is not bankrupt) is obliged to transfer t to the failing bank, which the receiving bank then
will use to pay to its customers. Because the transfer t needs to be made only if one of
the parties defaults, but otherwise nets out against incoming payments, we refer to it as
the Additional Settlement Obligation (ASO). In a gross settlement system, there is no ASO
because settlement always occurs immediately.
Supervision and Regulation In each country, a local supervisor (LS) is in charge of
banking supervision. At time 0, the supervisor in country i, LSi, can observe perfectly the
local bank’s type, qi, but it receives no information about the foreign bank’s type, qj.
4We could instead have assumed that the banks are only liable for the net amount of outstanding payments
(so-called ’netting by novation’). For …nancial contagion to occur, we would then need to assume non-
balanced payment streams such that a failing bank could have net liabilities.
5The local supervisors decide jointly about banks’ access to the net system. Only if both
supervisors agree, the banks in both countries are allowed to settle on a net basis. Otherwise,
they have to use the gross settlement system. The supervisors design the payment system
as to maximize local welfare. Welfare-maximizing access regulation, however, depends on
the risk of both the local and the foreign bank, i.e. on the information gathered by both
supervisors. The supervisors have therefore incentives to exchange information about the
risk of the private banks. We model the information exchange in the following way: Before
the game starts (e.g. at time T = ¡1), the supervisors agree upon a scheme that decides for
which (q1;q2) net settlement should be allowed. At this stage there is no con‡ict of interest
as the countries are identical before the risks are realized. The supervisors therefore choose
the scheme that maximizes the expected welfare of the countries. Afterwards, the regulatory
game is as follows: (1) The private banks apply to settle on a net basis, (2) The supervisors
report the local banks’ type to each other. If the types are such that netting should be
allowed according to the pre-negotiated scheme, the permission is granted. Otherwise, the
banks use the gross system. We discuss the scheme and the regulatory game in more detail
later.
We do not assume that there is deposit insurance as we are considering large-value pay-
ment systems. The transfers in these systems, which usually originate from corporate clients
rather than single households, are very large. Deposit insurance, as it is in place in most
countries, would therefore only cover a small fraction of the deposits in question.5;6
Information At time zero, the local bank and local supervisor can observe the local bank’s
type. We assume that the supervisors cannot observe the risk of the foreign bank. We con-
sider two di¤erent scenarios regarding the private banks’ information: in the …rst, the local
bank does not receive any information about the foreign bank’s type. In the second, it can
perfectly observe the foreign bank’s type. At time 1, supervisors, private banks, and cus-
tomers receive a perfect signal about the success of the risky projects in both countries.
Assumption 1: The customers observe the type of settlement system used at time 1.
Assumption 1 implies that the customers observe the type of settlement system used by
the banks only at the time when the signal about the return of the risky asset is received.7
Our main results do not depend on this assumption, but it allows us to solve the model in
closed form. We relax Assumption 1 in section 6.3.
5In the euro-area, deposit insurance covers between 15.000 and 100.000 euros (see Masciandaro and
Cappella 1999). However, the average size of cross-border payments for commercial use in TARGET is
larger than 5.400.000 euro (source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 1999).
6Deposit insurance would introduce no additional moral hazard problems in our model. Therefore, a full
deposit insurance would increase the welfare in the netting system unambiguously, since bank runs would
be eliminated. Details are available upon request.
7Suppose the consumers could observe the settlement system before making transfers. The choice of
settlement system contains information about the risk of the banks. The interest rate would therefore have
to be contingent on the type of settlement system chosen to avoid that the consumers withdraw their deposits.
6The timing is summarized as follows:
T = 0 T = 1 T = 2
morning - bank and supervisor i observe qi - customers A transfer - customers B transfer
- banks apply to use net system - gross system: settlement - gross system: settlement
- information exchange
- supervisors decide upon access
evening - customers A deposit - risky returns observed - risky returns realized
- banks invest - customers B deposit - net system: settlement
- net system: settlement - customers B withdraw
- customers A withdraw
3. Gross and Net Settlement
3.1. The Customers
At time 0, when the deposit contract with the customers A is signed, neither the banks’
types nor the settlement system are known. However, the risk incurred by the customers
A when depositing in the bank depends on both these factors. The customers A therefore
demand an interest rate, r, which compensates them for this risk. In the following analysis,
we will see that in the base model, the interest rate does not a¤ect the choice of settlement
system. This allows us to solve the game backwards: First, the choice of settlement system
is determined as a function of the banks’ types. This is done in sections 4 and 5. Afterwards,
we …nd the interest rate that ensures customers A a non-negative expected return on their
deposits. The interest rate is derived in appendix B.
The OLG structure of the model implies that the banks use customers B’s deposits to
return the deposits to customers A. At time 2, the customers B are then paid back their
deposits out of the returns from the risky technology. Customers B observe both the type
of settlement system and the success of the risky technology in the two countries before
depositing. The customers B do not deposit in a bank with an unsuccessful technology,
as the bank will not be able to return the deposits at time 2. In the following sections,
it is discussed under which conditions the customers B invest in a bank with a successful
technology. For now, notice: Customers B face no uncertainty about the value of the bank’s
assets. Hence, if the customers B deposit in the bank, they demand zero interest rate, as
they are certain to be repaid.
3.2. Gross Settlement
In a gross settlement system, the banks need to hold t reserves every period to be able to
settle all outgoing transfers. The banks use the deposits of customers B to pay customers A.
7The customers B deposit only 1, but the banks have to pay 1+r to customers A. Hence, in
the …rst period, the banks hold additional r reserves on top of the settlement requirements.
At time 0, banks thus must invest at least t+r into reserves to be able to ful…ll its obligations
to the customers A at time 1. For now, assume that the remaining 1¡t¡r are invested into
the risky technology. In appendix C, we show that this is the pro…t maximizing portfolio
choice in equilibrium.
If customers B deposit, customers A withdraw 1 + r at time 1. Each bank holds then
t in reserves and 1 ¡ t ¡ r in the risky asset. If the project is successful, the banks have
(1 ¡ t ¡ r)R + t at time 2. Therefore, customers B deposit if and only if the technology is
successful and
(1 ¡ t¡ r)R + t ¸ 1 (3.1)
We assume that (3.1) holds.8 If the risky technology is unsuccessful, customers B do
not deposit, as the bank cannot return the deposit at time 2. The bank is then forced into
bankruptcy at time 1, because it cannot pay 1 + r to customers A. Since the liquidation
value of an unsuccessful technology is zero, the customers A only receive the reserves that
the bank holds, t+ r.
For known qi, bank i’s expected pro…ts in the gross system are
¼
i
G(qi) = (1 ¡ qi)[(1 ¡ r ¡ t)R ¡ (1 ¡ t)]: (3.2)
The expected welfare is
W
i
G(qi) = (1 ¡ t¡ r)[(1 ¡ qi)R ¡ 1]: (3.3)
The higher the value of transfers, t, the less e¢cient is gross settlement, since less can be
invested in the more pro…table risky technology. Similarly, welfare and pro…ts are decreasing
in the interest rate, because of the additional reserves that the bank needs to hold, while
they are increasing in the return on the risky technology.
Welfare and pro…ts do not coincide because of limited liability and because the customers
face informational constraints. The bank does not take into account the loss incurred by
the customers if the bank fails, as it faces limited liability. If the customers observed the
banks’ types and the settlement system chosen, they would demand an interest that would
re‡ect the true risk incurred when depositing in the bank. The interest rate would make
the bank internalize the losses of the customers, and welfare and pro…ts would be aligned.
Here, however, the customers observe neither the settlement system chosen nor the risks of
the banks. Hence, they cannot adjust the interest rate to the risk, and this drives in a wedge
between public and private interests. We would like to emphasize, as discussed in section
6.3, that welfare and pro…ts still would not coincide if the customers observed the settlement
system but not the types of the banks.
8If (3.1) does not hold, the banks cannot invest in the risky technology when settlement is done on a
gross basis. Welfare and pro…ts are then trivially equal to zero.
83.3. Net Settlement
In a net settlement system, banks do not need to hold reserves for settlement purposes. They
still have to hold r to pay the customers A the promised interest rate. As before, we assume
that the remaining 1 ¡ r is invested in the risky technology. In appendix C this is shown to
be optimal in equilibrium.
Suppose that the risky technology of one of the banks fails. The bank with the low return
goes bankrupt because the customers B do not deposit. The pro…ts of the other bank are
adversely a¤ected as well because of the Additional Settlement Obligation (ASO). Following
our assumptions, ASO is equal to t. The bank holds only r reserves, which it has to pay to
the customers A at time 1. To pay (parts of) ASO, it is necessary to liquidate Minf1¡r;
t
Lg
of the risky technology. Our analysis depends crucially on whether the bank can repay the
customers B after liquidating some of the risky technology. If the bank cannot repay the
customers B, these do not deposit, and all of the risky technology is liquidated to pay the
customers A. This is the case of ”Full Contagion”. On the other hand, if the bank is able
to repay the customers B, these will deposit, and the bank survives. We refer to this case
as ”Partial Contagion”.9 Partial Contagion (PC) occurs if and only if10
(1 ¡ r ¡
t
L
)R ¸ 1: (3.4)
Assumption 2: There is Partial Contagion.
The case of Full Contagion will be discussed in section 6.1. Under Partial Contagion, a
bank will make positive pro…ts if its own risky technology is successful (and zero pro…ts if
it isn’t). Pro…ts are highest if the other bank also succeeds. For given qi;qj, the expected
pro…ts of Bank i trading with Bank j are given as:
¼
i




We see that with net settlement, the foreign bank’s failure rate qj is crucial for expected
pro…ts: A high counterparty risk reduces pro…ts of participating in the netting system be-
cause there is a high probability that a bank has to pay the Additional Settlement Obligation,
t, to the failing bank. Pro…ts increase in the liquidation value of a successful project, since
it reduces the fraction of the risky technology that needs to be liquidated to pay ASO.
The expected welfare of country i is:
W
i





¡ qi(1 ¡ qj)
¸
: (3.6)
In the case of failure, customers A receive only r from the local bank. In addition to this,
the customers receive t (ASO) from the foreign bank if it survives.
9’Full’ and ’Partial’ Contagion correspond to de Bandt and Hartmann’s (1999) classi…cation of ’weak’
and ’strong’ contagion.
10Notice that condition (3.4) also implies that the consumers B deposit in the gross system when the
return is high.
94. Public Regulation
In this section we characterize the supervisors’ regulation of access to the net settlement
system. First, we assume that the supervisors observe both the type of the local and of
the foreign bank (symmetric information). This serves to illustrate the preferences of the
supervisors and to explain some of the e¤ects driving the model. Afterwards, we turn to
the complete model where supervisors observe only the local bank’s type and must exchange
information about the types to regulate e¢ciently (local supervision).
In order to present the communication between the supervisors as clearly as possible, we
assume that the private banks always propose net settlement. The supervisors then decide
how payments should be settled, as there is net settlement if they accept the proposal and
gross settlement if they reject it. In section 5, we analyze the strategic interaction between
the private proposal and the public regulation.
4.1. Benchmark: Symmetric Information
We analyze the outcome if the supervisors receive a perfect signal about the risk of the local
and of the foreign bank. We assume that the supervisors are interested in maximizing their
own country’s welfare when deciding between net and gross settlement.








= t(R ¡ 1)(1 ¡ qi) ¡ qjt
µ




¢W 1(q1;q2) = 0 and ¢W 2(q2;q1) = 0 are displayed in Figure 4.1(a). ¢Wi(qi;qj) = 0
divides the (qi;qj)-space into two regions. Below the curve, net settlement maximizes the
welfare of Country i, while gross settlement maximizes welfare above the curve.
The supervisors allow net settlement only if the risk of the foreign bank is not too high.
This is due to the basic trade-o¤ between gross and net settlement systems: If the foreign
bank is risky, gross settlement is the preferable mode of settlement, since it eliminates the
risk of contagion. On the other hand, if the foreign bank is relatively safe, net settlement is
optimal because reserve requirements are lower.
¢W i = 0 is downward sloping because the investment in the risky technology is larger
under net than under gross settlement. Therefore, as the probability of failure of this tech-
nology increases, welfare in the net system decreases more than in the gross system. In order
to keep indi¤erence between net and gross settlement, the foreign bank must be of a lower
risk type.
Figure 4.1(a) illustrates how the interests of the two countries do not completely coin-
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(b) Asym. Information: An Example
Figure 4.1: The Supervisors’ Preferences over the Mode of Settlement
respectively. In region B (C), however, the supervisor of country 1 (2), in which the bank
with the lower risk is located, prefers gross settlement, while the one in country 2 (1) prefers
the net system. The supervisor of the country with the lower risk is more reluctant to use
net settlement, as it is relatively more likely to pay ASO than to receive it.
4.2. Local Supervision
From now on we assume that there is local supervision and the supervisors observe only the
local bank’s type. As an introductory example, consider Figure 4.1(b). The private bank in
country 1 is of type q¤
1. We look at the incentives of the supervisor in Country 1 (LS1) to
reveal this information truthfully to the foreign national bank (LS2). LS1 maximizes local
welfare, so he would prefer net settlement whenever the foreign bank is of a type lower or
equal to q¤
2. However, if LS1 revealed the type q¤
1 truthfully, LS2 would never allow net
settlement. Therefore, LS1 would have incentives to try to induce the belief that the bank
was of type q¤¤
1 . (The local bank would then be allowed to use the net system for all types
lower than q¤
2.) Suppose instead that LS1 could only choose between revealing the true type,
q¤
1, or inducing the belief q¤¤¤
1 . Here, LS1 would reveal the type truthfully, as LS2 otherwise
would allow net settlement too often.11
The example shows that since the interests of the supervisors are not totally aligned,
the supervisors have incentives to induce a belief that is di¤erent from the bank’s true type.
Still, as the incentives of the supervisors are somewhat aligned, they do not want to induce
beliefs that are too di¤erent from the true type. We will show next that this facilitates the
information exchange between the supervisors.
11If the LS2 believed that the bank in country 1 was of type q¤¤¤
1 , he would allow net settlement for all
types lower than q¤¤






2, LS1 would prefer to reveal the type truthfully. A similar example, explained in more detail, is
given in section 4.3.
114.2.1. The Information Exchange
Both the local and the foreign bank’s type matter when the supervisors have to decide be-
tween a gross and a net settlement system. To regulate the international payment system
e¢ciently, the supervisors have incentives to exchange information about the private banks’
risks. We have in mind a situation where the national supervisors are sovereign and are not
directly subject to any international authority. Therefore, we will assume it is not possible
to set up a mechanism or an institution that can use transfers to extract the information
about the private banks’ types. Instead, we model the information exchange in the spirit
of ”cheap-talk”: The supervisors can costlessly signal the risk of the private banks through
written or oral communication, but they only volunteer this information truthfully (or, parts
of it) if it serves their own interests. The existing literature analyzing signalling games with
costless signals look at situations with one sender and one receiver (see, e.g., Crawford and
Sobel (1982), Melumad and Shibano (1991), and Stein (1989)). We extend the analysis to
the case of two-sided communication where both parties send and receive signals. The results
obtained in this section are thus of some independent interest.
The information exchange is modelled the following way: At T = ¡1, before the banks’
types are realized, the supervisors agree upon a binding scheme that maps the signals sent by
the supervisors into acceptance or rejection of the proposal of net settlement. This scheme
maximizes expected welfare.12 At T = 0, after the risks have been realized, the supervisors
send a signal about the local bank’s risk. Once the signals have been sent, the settlement
system is given by the scheme.13 The information received from the foreign supervisor is
con…dential, and supervisors do not pass this information on to the private banks.14
There exists, of course, an incentive compatible scheme where the supervisors agree
always to implement either a gross or a net settlement system. Proposition 1 characterizes
the scheme when the information exchange matters for the choice of settlement system.
Invoking the revelation principle, we restrict attention to incentive compatible schemes. We
consider only schemes that are piecewise continuous, symmetric, and specify (as a function
of qi) the maximal type of the foreign bank for which net settlement is allowed.
Proposition 1. Suppose the foreign bank’s risk is uniformly distributed between 0 and q.
An incentive compatible scheme, ©n(¢), de…nes for each local risk qi the maximal foreign risk
qj for which transfers are settled in a net system. ©n(¢) is characterized as follows:






n = q. Interval 1 is de…ned as I1 ´ [0;qn
1].
12Alternatively we could assume that a welfare-maximizing supranational regulator decided upon access
to the net system. As long as he could not use transfers to extract the information of the local supervisors,
he would choose the same scheme as the one implemented by the local supervisors.
13Since the signals are binding, it is not formally a ’cheap-talk’ game. We show in Corollary 1 that the
schemes derived are also incentive compatible with non-binding signals.
14We need this assumption to ensure that the private banks always invest as much as possible in the risky
technology. However, this assumption is not crucial for our results. We show in Appendix C that if signals
were non-binding, the assumption would not be necessary as the supervisors would exchange less information
about the private banks’ types.
122. ©n(¢) = qn



















































The schemes with two and with three intervals are shown in Figure 4.2. Under these
schemes, the supervisors reveal the banks’ types truthfully, and the banks settle in the net
system whenever qj · ©k(qi), k 2 f2;3g.
There are several things to notice about the schemes. First, since the two supervisors
face the same scheme, it must be symmetric around the 45-degree line.15 Second, a scheme
consists of constants segments with ”jumps”. The example in the previous section illustrated
how the supervisors would have incentives to report a type that is not the true one, but close.
Along the constant parts of the scheme, it makes no di¤erence to tell such a ’small lie’. The
constant parts are thus necessary for the scheme to be incentive compatible. Finally, notice
that the schemes are symmetric around ¢Wi(qi;qj) = 0 at the jumps. This implies that if
the local bank is located at the border to the next interval (i.e. at a jump), the supervisor
is exactly indi¤erent between being in the lower or in the upper interval. We show that this
ensures that if the local bank is of a type located close to a jump, the supervisor does not
want to tell a small lie in order to pretend to be in the nearby interval (and do net settlement
with a di¤erent population of the foreign bank).
The constant parts and the jumps are su¢cient to rule out pro…table deviations where
the supervisors tell a small lie. In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the supervisors
neither have incentives to tell a ’big lie’ and report a type that is far from the true one. The
scheme satis…es this condition because, as illustrated by the example, the banks do not wish
to induce beliefs too di¤erent from the true type.
We have chosen to focus on the case of binding signals, as it allows for a mechanism
where the supervisors report the banks’ true types. The next corollary shows that the
results obtained do not depend upon whether signals are binding or not. If signals were
non-binding, the supervisors would …rst send the signals. After having received the signal,
the supervisors would unilaterally decide whether to accept net settlement. Corollary 1
shows that any scheme characterized by Proposition 1 would also be incentive compatible
with non-binding signals. The only di¤erence would be that instead of reporting the type,
15Otherwise, there would exist some (qi;qj) for which the scheme would indicate net settlement for one
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Figure 4.2: Incentive Compatible Schemes
the supervisors would report the interval to which the local bank belongs. The game with
non-binding signals is explained in more detail in the proof of the corollary.
Corollary 1. The schemes characterized by Proposition 1 are also incentive compatible
with non-binding signals.
Finally, we make one additional assumption:
Assumption 3: If a supervisor received no information about the foreign bank’s type, he
would never allow net settlement.
Our results do not hinge on this assumption, but it allows us to restrict attention to the
simplest of the possible cases. We relax Assumption 3 in section 6.2.
Proposition 2. Consider the schemes de…ned by Proposition 1. Under Assumption 3 there
exist an unique incentive compatible scheme with two intervals and none with more than
two intervals.
From Proposition 2 then follows that we only need to consider schemes with either one
interval (i.e. always accept or reject the proposal of net settlement) or with two intervals.
4.3. The (In)E¢ciency of Public Regulation
The previous section has shown how the supervisors face incentive problems when exchang-
ing information about the private banks’ risk. In this section we analyze the implications
this has for public regulation.
As a …rst result, we show that the information exchange does make a di¤erence. In spite
of the incentive problems, the supervisors regulate more e¢ciently if they communicate.
14Formally, the proof consists of showing that the expected welfare under the two interval
scheme is higher than if the banks would do either net or gross settlement for all types.
Lemma 1. The scheme with two intervals gives higher expected welfare than the schemes
with one interval.
In order to determine the e¢ciency of the public regulation, we compare the scheme with
the two-interval scheme that would be implemented if there were no incentive problems. This
is the two interval scheme that maximizes expected welfare ex ante; i.e. before the banks’
types are realized.16 A two interval scheme would, of course, not be optimal if there were
no incentive problems, but the comparison tells us whether the access regulation to the net
settlement system is too strict or too lax.
Proposition 3. Suppose there were no incentive problem but the supervisors could only
implement schemes with two intervals. The maximal type for which the supervisor would
allow net settlement would be strictly smaller than q2
1.
Proposition 3, which is the main result of this paper, shows that the incentive problems
in the information exchange induce the supervisors to be too lax in their access criteria to
the net settlement system. As a result, the systemic risk under public regulation is higher
than optimal.
The intuition behind this result is given by Figure 4.2(a). In equilibrium, net settlement
is allowed if both banks are of a type lower or equal to q2
1. Consider the problem faced by
a supervisor when signalling the local bank’s type. If he signals a type lower than q2
1, there
will be net settlement whenever the foreign bank is of a type lower than q2
1. If, instead, the
supervisor signals a type higher than q2
1, there will be gross settlement. Therefore, the signal
sent by the supervisor makes only a di¤erence if the foreign bank is of a type lower or equal
to q2
1. Hence, the supervisor compares the expected welfare under gross and net settlement
conditional on the foreign bank being of a type lower or equal to q2
1. This is equivalent to
comparing the welfare under net and gross settlement assuming that the foreign bank is of
the average type, 1
2q2
1.17 Since the supervisors base their decision on the average type, they
allow net settlement for realizations where they would have preferred gross settlement. For
example, if the bank in Country 1 is of type q2





- even if both supervisors under these circumstances would have preferred gross settlement.
It is important to notice that the excessive systemic risk under public regulation does not
reduce the surplus of the customers. The customers foresee the equilibrium outcome and ask
for an interest rate which compensates them for the risk they incur. If the supervisors have
too lax access criteria to the net settlement system, the customers ask for a higher interest
rate as depositing in the bank is riskier. This reduces the pro…ts for the banks because fewer
reserves can be invested in the pro…table long-run technology. In our model, the cost of
excessive systemic risk is thus carried by the banks rather than the customers.
16Since both countries are ex-ante identical it does not matter whether we refer to local or global welfare.
17This is true in this model since the types are uniformly distributed and welfare is linear in the foreign
bank’s type once the own type is known.
155. The Private Banks
We turn now to the settlement decision of the private banks. In the previous section it was
assumed that the private banks always propose net settlement. Therefore, the national su-
pervisors could decide between gross and net settlement. The supervisors, however, cannot
impose net settlement against the wishes of the private banks. It is thus left to be shown
that the private banks propose net settlement in the region where the supervisors allow it.
The private banks move …rst in the regulatory game and propose how to settle payments.
The private banks’ proposal depends both on the regulation they foresee and on the infor-
mation that they have about each other. The regulation by the supervisors was determined
in section 4, so we turn here to the proposal made by the private banks under di¤erent
informational assumptions.
The analysis of the private banks has three parts. First, we determine the preferences of
the private banks over net and gross settlement. Afterwards, we solve the model assuming
that the private banks have no more information than the supervisors. We show that the
results derived under public regulation are the equilibrium outcome. It seems plausible that
a bank operating internationally can have better information about its foreign counterpar-
ties than the national supervisor. Ideally the regulation of the payment system should be
designed to take advantage of the private banks’ information (see also Rochet and Tirole
(1996)). This would be an argument for leaving the access regulation in the hands of the
private sector, as it is, for example, currently done in European Monetary Union. In the last
part, we thus examine whether superior information alone can justify a ’hands-o¤’ approach
to access regulation.
5.1. Gross and Net Settlement
Let us start by determining the banks’ preferences over the mode of settlement. From (3.2)
and (3.5), we derive a threshold, qPR, for the foreign bank’s risk such that bank i is indi¤erent






A bank prefers to net out transfers only if its counterpart’s risk of failure is smaller than
qPR; that is, if the probability of contagion is low. The important thing to notice is that
a private bank’s preferences do not depend on its own type. Since the bank faces limited
liability, it earns zero pro…ts if it fails itself. Consequently, the bank’s own risk does not
in‡uence the choice between net and gross settlement.
As long as the local bank is successful, it carries the full cost of net settlement because
it pays ASO if the foreign bank fails. The bank does not, however, take into account the
loss experienced by customers if both banks fail. From point of view of welfare, the bank
chooses net settlement too often unless it is sure not to fail. Figure 5.1 illustrates this point:
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Figure 5.1: The Private Banks’ Preferences
5.2. No Informational Advantage
Here we assume that neither the private banks nor the supervisors observe the risk of the
foreign bank. Like the supervisors, the private banks can exchange information. The banks
cannot decide whether to implement a net settlement system or not, as the netting must
be approved of by the supervisors. Instead, we assume that the banks can agree upon a
scheme that maps the signals sent into a proposal made to the supervisors (i.e. net or gross
settlement). The analysis is similar to the one in section 4, so we have directed it to the
appendix.
Proposition 4. If the private banks have no more information than the national supervi-
sors, the private banks do net settlement if and only if q1;q2 · q2
1.
The results derived in section 4 do hold as long as the private do not have better in-
formation than the supervisors. We show that private banks propose net settlement in a
larger area than the supervisors allow. In equilibrium, the supervisors overrule the private
banks’ proposal whenever they propose net settlement and at least one of the banks is of
type higher than q2
1.
Notice that qPR < q2
1, so the private banks do net settlement more often than they would
prefer (see Figure 5.1). However, they cannot agree on a scheme that proposes net settlement
in a smaller area. The reason is that the private banks face more severe incentive problems in
the information exchange than the national supervisors do. For the supervisors, the bene…ts
of net settlement are decreasing in the risk of the local bank. The incentive to pretend that
the local bank is of a low type is thus decreasing with the risk. In the case of the private
banks, all types have the same incentive to pretend to be of a low type. This can also be seen
in Figure 5.1 where ¢W i = 0 is downwards sloping while ¢¼i = 0 (i.e. qPR) is constant. As
17a result of this, the information exchange among the private banks is less e¢cient than the
one among the supervisors, and the banks do net settlement whenever it is allowed.
5.3. Superior Information
We now consider the polar assumption that the banks receive a perfect signal about each
others’ type. The private banks then propose net settlement if they are both of a type lower
than qPR. The next proposition shows that given this information, the supervisors cannot
exchange any additional information and they accept the private proposal.
Proposition 5. Under symmetric information between the private banks, public regulation
cannot improve upon the private proposal.
Proposition 5 implies that if the private banks can observe each other’s type, they de-
cide the settlement method de facto. The national supervisors could overrule the private
proposal, but in equilibrium they never do so. Under circumstances where the banks are
likely to have good information about their counterparties, for example, because they oper-
ate internationally, this result gives some justi…cation to leaving the access regulation in the
hands of the private sector.
6. Extensions
In thissection we relax Assumptions 1-3. We donot include the full analysisof the extensions,
as most parts are similar to the base model. Instead, the following contains a discussion of
the results obtained and points out the most important di¤erences compared to the main
text. The details of the analysis are available upon request. In all three extension, it is not
possible to solve the model entirely in closed form, so we rely partly on numerical simulations.
6.1. Full Contagion
In the preceding section, we focused on the case where the failure of one bank did not lead to
bankruptcy of the other bank (Partial Contagion (PC)). In this section, we turn to the other
case of Full Contagion (FC) where a bank with a successful project is forced into bankruptcy
if its counterparty in the netting system fails. Under Full Contagion, it is not possible to
solve the model in closed form, since the scheme agreed upon by the supervisors and the
interest rate are interdependent.
The failure of one bank in the netting system obliges the surviving bank to pay ASO to
the failing bank. Full contagion occurs if the amount of assets that needs to be liquidated
for this purpose is so large that customers B cannot get the promised payment of 1 at time
2.18 As a consequence, customers B do not deposit, and the bank must liquidate its entire
technology in order to pay the proceeds to customers A. Thus, the bank fails at time 1.
18We are thus in the case of Full Contagion for low L (many assets need to be liquidated), low R (time 2
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Figure 6.1: From Partial to Full Contagion
Since the claims of customers A are senior to those of the other bank, the value of the liqui-
dation goesto the customersonly, and the additional settlement to the other bank isnot paid.
This implies that in the net system, the banks earn positive pro…ts only if they both are
successful. Pro…ts and welfare are given as:
¼
i
N(qi;qj) = (1 ¡ qi)(1 ¡ qj)[(1 ¡ r)R ¡ 1]: (6.1)
W
i
N(qi;qj) = (1 ¡ r)[(1 ¡ qi)(1 ¡ qj)R + (1 ¡ qi)qjL ¡ 1]. (6.2)
Notice that under FC, the size of the additional settlement obligation, t, a¤ects neither
pro…ts nor welfare directly since it is never paid.19 Hence, both countries are worse o¤ under
FC compared to PC: the country of the failure’s origin because it does not receive ASO,
and the other country because the bank goes bankrupt. Net settlement is therefore less
attractive under FC. In a gross system, expected pro…ts and expected welfare are as under
Partial Contagion. We de…ne ¢W i
FC(qi;qj) ´ Wi
N;FC(qi;qj) ¡ W i
G(qi;qj).
Figure 6.1 illustrates how the preferences of the supervisors change as we switch from
Partial to Full Contagion. The welfare under net settlement is reduced discretely as we
enter the region of FC. Hence, the region in which net settlement is preferred diminishes
(the ¢W i = 0 curves jump inwards). As a result of this, public regulation becomes more
restrictive. Figure 6.1 shows how the highest type that is allowed in the net settlement
system is reduced from q2
1;PC to q2
1;FC.
19t has an indirect e¤ect via the interest rate. However, at the time the decision about settlement is made,
the interest rate is …xed.
19Let us now turn to the private banks. Comparing equations (3.2) and (6.1), we …nd that






(1 ¡ r)R ¡ 1
: (6.3)
Consider again a set of parameters marking the border between Full and Partial Con-
tagion. While the expected local welfare is reduced discretely, the change in the banks’
expected pro…ts is gradual. Starting in the region of PC and approaching the border to FC,
the pro…ts of the local bank go to zero in the state of the world where the bank has to pay
ASO. On the border, and in the region FC, the pro…ts are zero in this state of the world.
As there is no discontinuity in the pro…ts from PC to FC, there is no discontinuity in qPR.
Under Full Contagion the problem of banks’ limited liability is more serious than it was
under Partial Contagion: Even if only one of the banks fails, customers A receive less than
the promised amount of 1 + r (under PC this was the case only if both banks failed). The
banks disregard the welfare of the customers and propose net settlement for too high risks.
Because the welfare cost of net settlement is higher under Full Contagion, the wedge between
private and public interests is wider. Therefore, the supervisors might overrule the private
proposal also if the private banks have perfect information about each others’ types; unlike
under Partial Contagion. The case for active public involvement in access regulation is thus
stronger if the systemic impact of a foreign failure is high.
6.2. Schemes With More Than Two Intervals
Assumption 3 was a very convenient assumption, as it allowed us to focus on the simplest
case where no incentive compatible schemes with more than two intervals existed. If the
private banks observe each others’ type (Superior Information), a relaxation of Assumption
3 does not change the results. The private banks will as before decide the mode of settle-
ment.20 But, if the private have no more information than the supervisors (No Informational
Advantage), relaxing Assumption 3 changes the analysis of the game, but not necessarily
the equilibrium outcome.
Suppose from now on that neither the private banks nor the supervisors observe the
foreign bank’s type. We …rst consider the case where the private banks always propose net
settlement.21 Here, the supervisors decide whether the banks should net out transfers or
settle them in the gross system. We obtain the following result about the public information
exchange:
Lemma 2. If Assumption 3 does not hold, there exist unique incentive compatible schemes
with two and with three intervals.
Numerical simulations show that there cannot exist an incentive compatible scheme with
4 intervals. It is possible to show that this implies that there cannot exist schemes with
20The reader can verify that the proof of Proposition 5 does not make use of Assumption 3.
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Figure 6.2: The Equilibrium Exchange of Private Banks and Supervisors
more than four intervals either. Therefore, the supervisors can exchange information using
either a two or a three interval scheme (©2 and ©3, respectively). Figure 4.2 illustrated these
schemes. The supervisors choose ©2 for most values, as it gives the highest expected welfare.
However, for high R, it is ©3 that approximates the preferences of the supervisors best and
is the optimal choice.
Suppose now that the private banks exchange information. The scheme that the private
banks agree upon has the following general form: The private banks propose net settlement
if and only if at least one of the banks is of a type lower or equal to e qPR. Let us …rst consider
the candidate equilibrium where the supervisors afterwards agree upon ©3. It can be shown
that foreseeing ©3, the private banks propose net settlement in a strictly larger area than
©3. The three interval scheme is therefore as de…ned by Proposition 1, and the supervisors
sometimes overrule the private proposal. This candidate equilibrium is illustrated in Figure
6.2(a) where the private scheme is denoted ©PR
3 .
Alternatively, the supervisors can agree upon a two interval scheme. Here, the private
and the public scheme overlap. As a result, the public two interval scheme given by Propo-
sition 1 is not incentive compatible. Instead, the private and the public scheme must be
determined simultaneously. Denote the public scheme obtained by e ©2. e q2
1 is the border
between the …rst and the second interval of the public scheme. This candidate equilibrium,
which is illustrated in Figure 6.2(b), works the following way: The private banks propose
net settlement if one of the banks (or both) is of a type lower or equal to e qPR
2 . The private
proposal is accepted only if both banks are of a type lower or equal to e q2
1.
We see that the supervisors can also choose between a two and a three interval scheme if
the private banks exchange information (even though the two interval scheme is di¤erent).
21It turns out that the two interval scheme is optimal for the supervisors. If the private banks
exchange information, the supervisors respond by using the scheme e ©2.
Let us consider the equilibrium of the full game. The private banks move …rst and decide
whether to exchange information or not. Numerical simulations show that the private banks
prefer ©2 to e ©2. As long as the supervisors choose ©2 rather than ©3, it is thus the subgame
perfect equilibrium that the private banks always propose net settlement. This equilibrium
is the same as in the base model. However, the private banks prefer e ©2 to ©3. For high R,
where the supervisors would choose ©3 if the private banks always proposed net settlement,
the private banks exchange information in order to induce the supervisors to play the scheme
e ©2 instead of ©3.
6.3. Contingent Interest Rates
We have assumed throughout the paper that customers observe the type of settlement sys-
tem used only at time 1. In this section we relax this assumption. Customers now demand
an interest rate that is contingent on the type of settlement system implemented. We are
interested in whether contingent interest rate eliminates the wedge between pro…ts and wel-
fare. Because of computational complexity, most results derived here are numerical.
It is not a priori clear whether the interest rate is highest in the gross or in the net
settlement system, as there are two e¤ects at play. First, the customers know that if their
bank is in a gross settlement system, the higher reserve holdings imply that it returns a
larger share of the deposit if it fails. This e¤ect goes in the direction of a lower interest
rate in the gross settlement system. Second, the customers update their beliefs about the
banks’ types after having observed the mode of settlement. Gross settlement is a bad signal
about the bank’s type, since at least one of the banks must be of a high risk type. This
e¤ect implies a higher interest rate in the gross system as to re‡ect the higher probability
of failure. The numerical analysis shows that the second e¤ect usually dominates. For most
parameter values, the interest rate in the gross system is higher than the one in a net system.
Denote the interest rates in the gross and net system by rG and rN, respectively. The
gain in welfare and pro…ts from netting are now




(1 ¡ qi) + qi
¸
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¢¼i ´ ¼N(rN) ¡ ¼G(rG) = (1 ¡ qi)
·
(rG ¡ rN)R + t
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A spread in the interest rates rG > rN increases the amount of reserves that must be held
under gross settlement relative to net settlement. Hence, if the interest rates are contingent
on the mode of settlement, net settlement becomes more attractive. The region with net
settlement is larger than in the base model. Notice that @¢Wi=@(rG¡rN) < ¢¼i=@(rG¡rN).
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Figure 6.3: Contingent vs. Non-Contingent Interest Rates
it has on the public one.22 Therefore, the supervisors might overrule the private proposal of
net settlement even if the private banks observe each others’ type.
As an example, consider Figure 6.3 where the public and private preferences are displayed
for the same set of parameter values. The region of netting is larger with contingent rates,
independently of who decides upon the mode of settlement. The di¤erence is greatest for
the private preferences.
The numerical analysis veri…es that with contingent interest rates, banks’ pro…ts still
do not coincide with welfare. The intuition is, as explained earlier, that the interest rate
does not re‡ect the true risk, since the customers do not observe the banks’ types. Thus,
contingent interest rates are not enough to eliminate incentive problems in access regulation.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the regulation of access to international large-value payment
systems when supervision of the banking industry is a national task. We modeled the reg-
ulators’ decision to provide access to gross and net settlement systems. As a novel feature,
the communication between the supervisors about the private banks’ risk was endogenized.
Furthermore, we studied the outcome that private banks would choose if they were not sub-
ject to regulation, and compared the e¢ciency of publicly and privately regulated systems.
Both the public and private solutions are shown to be ine¢cient, since too risky banks
are allowed into the netting systems. Systemic risk is therefore higher than desirable. Unreg-
22The higher interest rate in the gross system increases the welfare of the consumers in the state of the
world where the two banks fail. This is not taken into account by the private banks. For the private banks,
the relative attractiveness of net settlement thus increases more in rG ¡rN than it does for the supervisors.
23ulated private systems are too risky because banks face limited liability. Banks do therefore
not take into account the full cost of bankruptcy. The ine¢ciency of the publicly imple-
mented system stems from national supervision. The national supervisors’ incentives are
not perfectly aligned, because the foreign economy carries some of the costs of failure in a
net settlement system. Therefore, the local supervisors have incentives to understate the
risk of the local bank to induce net settlement in cases where the foreign economy would
prefer gross settlement.
We …nd that if the private banks have the same information as the public authorities,
the decision about the mode of settlement should be made by the regulators. However, if
the private banks possess superior information about the foreign bank’s risk, say, because of
a high degree of integration in …nancial markets, it can be e¢cient to leave this decision to
the private banks. Private access regulation does especially well in terms of welfare if the
systemic impact of a failure is low, as the private banks internalize most of the costs of net
settlement. On the other hand, when failures propagate through the system, the customers
bear most of the cost of the systemic crisis. Then, the case for public regulation is stronger.
Our model could be applied to the situation in the euro-area where international RTGS
and netting systems coexist. It points out circumstances under which a ”hands-o¤” policy
should be followed with regard to payment system regulation. Accordingly, the model gives
some justi…cation to the European decision of leaving the implementation of netting systems
in the hands of the private sector. The framework could also be used to analyze domestic
payment systems in which foreign banks participate. If these banks are subject to home-
country supervision, similar communication problems can arise between host- and home
country supervisors. Finally, the communication exchange modelled in this paper could be
used to study the supervisory framework not only for payment systems, but more generally
for international banking.
24A. Proofs of Propositions and Remarks
A.1. Proposition 1
We look for an incentive compatible scheme such that if a supervisor signals that the type of
the private bank is qi; he commits to settling on a net basis whenever the foreign supervisor
signals qj · ©n(qi). For this scheme to be feasible, in the sense that all types settle net
whenever the foreign bank has a risk lower than ©n(¢), ©n(¢) has to be symmetric: ©n(¢) =
(©n)¡1(¢) for all q 2 [0;q]. De…ne f1(q1) st. ¢W 1(q1;f1(q1)) = 0. It follows from (4.1):
f1(q1) =
(1 ¡ q1)(R ¡ 1)L





(R ¡ 1)L ¡ qR
(R ¡ 1)L ¡ q(R ¡ L)
:
Step 1: f1(¢) is not symmetric:
Proof: For all 0 < L < 1 and R > 1 we have that f1(0) < (f1)¡1(0). f1(¢) is therefore
not symmetric.
Step 2: ©n(q) cannot be continuously increasing or decreasing on an open set.
Proof: Suppose there exists some q st. ©n(q) < f1(q). If ©n(¢) is strictly increasing,
there exists some " st. ©n(q) < ©n(q + ") · f1(q). A supervisor with a private bank of
type q will therefore have incentives to deviate and signal the type q + ". On the other
hand, if ©n(¢) is strictly decreasing, there exist some " st. ©n(q) < ©n(q ¡ ") · f1(q). A
supervisor with a private bank of type q will therefore have incentives to deviate. A simi-
lar argument applies to ©n(q) > f1(q). If ©n(¢) is strictly in- or decreasing on an open set,
it has to be that ©n(¢) = f1(¢). However, as f1(¢) is not symmetric, this not a feasible scheme.
Step 3: Suppose there is a discontinuity at qn
i s.t. lim
q!(qn
























Proof: Incentive compatibility requires that all qi 2 (qn
i¡1;qn
i ] prefer to settle net with
all qj · qn
j+1, instead of doing net settlement only with qj · qn
j , while the opposite is true
for qi 2 (qn
i ;qn
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R¡L , which contradicts (A.5). Similarly,
it can be shown that if qn
j < qn









R¡L , which is satis…ed. We have therefore shown that it is not optimal to deviate to a
neighboring interval. It can be shown along the same lines that it is not optimal to deviate
to any other interval. (A.2) and qn
j < qn
j+1 are therefore su¢cient conditions for the scheme
to be incentive compatible.




from symmetry of ©n(¢); (A.2), and qn
1 < qn
2 < ::: < qn
n¡1. ¤
A.2. Corollary 1
If the signals are non-binding, the timing is the following: First the supervisors simulta-
neously send a signal about their type. Afterwards they decide simultaneously whether to
accept or to reject net settlement. Net settlement is only implemented if both supervisors
accept it.
In equilibrium, the supervisors do not signal the local bank’s type but instead to which
interval it belongs (see, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Stein (1989)). Assume that
the intervals are given by Proposition 1. We want to show that the schemes characterized
by Proposition 1 are sustainable in the following sense: The supervisors truthfully reveal
to which interval the private banks belong, and a private bank in interval Ii is allowed to
do net settlement if and only if the foreign bank belongs to an interval smaller or equal to In¡i.
26Suppose that the foreign supervisor truthfully reveals the foreign bank’s interval. The























i is the upper limit of Ii, all banks in Ii are allowed to settle net with a foreign bank
in In¡i. It follows immediately that the private bank is also allowed to do net settlement
if the foreign bank belongs to an interval lower than In¡i. Consider instead qn
i¡1; the lower

















it follows that a private bank in Ii is not allowed to do net settlement with a foreign bank
in In¡i+1 (or a higher interval).
We see that a local bank in Ii is allowed by the supervisor to net transfers out with the
foreign bank if and only the if foreign bank belongs to an interval in fI1;:::;In¡ig; i.e. for all
qj · qn
n¡i.
It is left to show that the supervisors reveal truthfully the interval to which the local
bank belongs. If the local supervisor signals truthfully that the local bank is in Ii, it can do
net settlement with all foreign banks in fI1;:::;In¡ig. It could instead signal that the private
bank belongs to Iz, z < i. The foreign supervisor would allow net settlement if the foreign
private banks belonged to fI1;:::;In¡zg. However, as the local supervisor does not allow net
settlement if the foreign bank belongs to fIn¡i+1;:::;In¡zg, truthful revelation gives the same
expected welfare as signalling a lower interval. Consider instead a deviation to Iy, y > i. The
foreign supervisor then allows net settlement for all fI1;:::;In¡yg. Here truthful revelation
dominates signalling Iy as the local supervisor prefers net settlement if the foreign private
banks belongs to fIn¡y+1;:::;In¡ig. The supervisors thus reveal truthfully the interval to
which the local bank belongs. ¤
A.3. Proposition 2 and Lemma 2
A.3.1. Existence and Uniqueness of the Scheme with 2 Intervals
From Proposition 1 it follows that q2















R + (R ¡ 1)L
¶
q ¡ (R ¡ 1)L = 0 (A.6)
It can be shown that there is only one relevant solution to this equation and that q2
1 2





2R + (R ¡ 1)L ¡
q¡
1
2R + (R ¡ 1)L
¢2 ¡ 2(R ¡ L)(R ¡ 1)L
R ¡ L
: (A.7)
Note that this result does not depend on Assumption 3.
27A.3.2. Existence and Uniqueness of the Scheme with 3 Intervals or more




Since ¢W(qi;qj) = 0 is downward sloping, for ¢W(x1;y1) = 0 and ¢W(x2;y2) = 0, we
have x1 < x2 () y1 > y2.



















1. It follows from (A.8) that qn
1 > q2





n¡1. Using a similar argument, it follows that qn
1 · q2
1.
Step 2: Inductive de…nition of sets.
Consider a scheme with n intervals and assume that n is even. The sets are de…ned in
an analogous way for n uneven. From step 1, we know that q2
1 · qn
n¡1 · q. De…ne by S1 the
set of all qn








Note that this set is identical for all n.




1) = 0. Using this equation,
we can characterize the set of all possible (qn
1;qn
n¡1), which we denote S2. Two conditions
need to be ful…lled for qn
1 to form part of a n-interval scheme: Firstly, qn
1 needs to ful…ll the
…rst incentive constraint for a qn
n¡1 2 S1. Secondly, qn
1 needs to satisfy 0 · qn
1 · q2
1 (see step



























n¡2)) = 0. This
equation implicitly de…nes qn
n¡2 as a function of qn
1 and qn
n¡1. Similarly to above, we can now
de…ne as S3 the set of all possible (qn
1;qn
n¡2;qn
n¡1) which ful…ll this last incentive constraint
for all admissible qn
1 and qn
























In a similar fashion, we can now proceed using the second constraint to obtain a set
that includes qn
2 (denoted S4), the second-last constraint to obtain a set that includes qn
n¡3
(denoted S5),














































Sn¡1 is of the same dimension as a solution to the scheme, but it does not take the last
constraint into account. We de…ne the set Sn the same way as before. This, however, implies
that the elements in Sn are of one dimension higher than the solution. In particular, the
elements in Sn have two entries qn¡n=2 (de…ned in Sn¡1) and qn

























Step 3: Conditions for existence of a scheme with n intervals.
The elements in Sn contain two entries corresponding to the variable qn=2 (e qn
n=2 and
qn¡n=2). Hence, there exist a scheme with n intervals if and only if there exists an element
in Sn satisfying qn
n=2 = qn¡n=2 and 0 < qn
1 < ::: < qn
n¡1 < 1. Notice that the set Si is identical
for all schemes with i intervals or more, because the constraints de…ning the sets are the
same. If Si = ;, it implies that there cannot exist a scheme with i intervals. However, it
also implies that there cannot exist schemes with more than i intervals, as all sets derived





n¡1 · 0 (> 0) if Assumption 3 holds (does not hold).
Under Assumption 3, the supervisors will not allow net settlement if they receive no
additional information about the foreign bank’s type. If the supervisors receive no informa-
tion, the expected type of the foreign bank is
1
2. Under Assumption 3, it must hold that
¢Wi(q;
1
2) · 0 for all q 2 [0;1]. This condition is satis…ed if and only if 2(R ¡ 1)L=R · 1.
We will need an additional bit of notation. From the de…nitions of the sets, it can be
seen that all the variables can be written as a function of qn



















2(R ¡ 1)L(1 ¡ qn
1)
qn







2(R ¡ 1)L(1 ¡ qn
n¡1)
qn
n¡1L + (1 ¡ qn
n¡1)R
.









n¡1L + (1 ¡ qn
n¡1)R)2(qn
1L + (1 ¡ qn
1)R)2 ¡ 1.




n¡1 · 0 implies that
2(R ¡ 1)L2
qn




n¡1L + (1 ¡ q
n
n¡1)R.
Using the expression qn
1 = 2(R ¡ 1)L(1 ¡ qn
n¡1)=(qn
n¡1L + (1 ¡ qn







n¡1L + (1 ¡ qn
n¡1)R
.
It is easy to verify that this condition is satis…ed if and only if Assumption 3 holds.
Step 5: Under Assumption 3 there exists no scheme with three intervals or more.
Before studying S3, let us determine S2. It is easy to verify that all values of qn
n¡1 in S1
also are a part of S2. qn
1(¢) is strictly decreasing and continuous in qn










n¡1in S2, we have qn
1(q2
1) = q2
1. This implies that qn
n¡2(q2


















n¡1 < 0. This violates 0 · qn
1 · qn
n¡2, so S3 = ;. Since S3 is empty, there cannot exist




n¡1) = (0;0;1). For n = 3, there exist no solution, since the condition
q3




Step 6: If Assumption 3 does not hold, there exists a unique scheme with three intervals.





1) = 0. For
qn
n¡1 = 1, the highest value of qn
n¡1 in S2, we have qn
1(1) = 0 < qn
n¡2(1) =
2(R¡1)L
R ¡ 1. In S2,
qn
n¡1 takes on all values between q2
1 and 1. qn
1(¢) and qn




n¡2(¢) are strictly decreasing and increasing in qn
n¡1, respectively, there exists
a unique qn
n¡1, qn
n¡1, belonging to (q2






We conclude that there exists a unique scheme with three intervals.¤
A.4. Lemma 1 and Proposition 3
We need to show that the two-interval scheme leads to a higher expected welfare than would
always choosing gross or net settlement. If the supervisors implement the scheme with two
30intervals, they can always obtain a gross settlement system by signalling qi = 1. In equi-
librium, however, the supervisors signal the banks’ true types. It follows from a revealed
preference argument that the scheme with two intervals gives higher expected welfare than
always implementing a gross settlement system.
Next, we show the scheme with two intervals also dominates a net settlement system for
all (qi;qj). Let e q be the end point of the …rst interval in a two interval scheme; that is, the


























e q(RL + R ¡ L) + 2L(R ¡ 1) = 0
Let e q¤ be the solution to the …rst order condition. Analysis of the …rst order derivative
shows that welfare increases up to e q = e q¤, and decreases afterwards. Calculations show that
q2
1 > e q¤ and Proposition 3 follows. Furthermore, net settlement for all (q1;q2) gives a lower
expected welfare than the scheme with two intervals as 1 > q2
1 > e q¤ and Lemma 1 follows.
¤
A.5. Proposition 4
In the regulatory game the private banks move …rst and propose the mode of settlement.
We saw in section 4 that the supervisors allow net settlement if and only if both banks are
of a type lower or equal to q2
1. For this to be the equilibrium outcome, however, the private
banks must propose net settlement if they are both of a type lower than q2
1.
The private banks can exchange information, which is modeled similarly to the regula-
tors’ exchange described in section 4.2.1. The private banks agree at time T = ¡1 on a
scheme that maps the signals sent by the two banks into a proposal made to the supervisors.
We only consider schemes where both banks either propose net or gross settlement, as it
is irrelevant whether one or two of the banks propose gross settlement. Denote the scheme
by ©PR(¢). We restrict attention to incentive compatible and piece-wise continuous schemes
where the banks propose net settlement if and only if qj · ©PR(qi). Finally, ©PR(¢) must be
symmetric as de…ned in the proof of Proposition 1.
First, trivial schemes in which banks agree to always settle in a net or always in a gross
system exist. Next, let us consider schemes where the proposal made depends on the sig-
nals sent. Similar to the information exchange of the regulators, we …nd that any incentive






i , for which ©PR(q0
i) 6= ©PR(q00




































where ©0 ´ ©PR(q0
i) and ©00 ´ ©PR(q00
i ). For q00
i , the reverse inequality needs to hold.
Since the banks’ preferences are independent of their type, both constraints have to
be ful…lled simultaneously for any qi 2 [0;1]. Therefore, (A.9) has to hold with equality.
De…ning ¢¼i(qi;qj) ´ ¼i
N(qi;qj) ¡ ¼i
G(qi), we …nd that for any qi, the constraint reduces to
©0¢¼i(qi; 1
2©0) = ©00¢¼i(qi; 1
2©(q00







i )) = q
PR (A.10)
with qPR de…ned by (5.1). Symmetry and equation (A.10) imply that there can be only one
jump; i.e. the scheme consists of maximally two intervals.
The private banks take into account the public regulation when they exchange infor-
mation. Let e q2
1 denote the endpoint of the …rst interval in the public two interval scheme.
(Since there cannot exist schemes with more than two intervals if the private propose net
settlement for all types, see Lemma 1, these schemes do also not exist if the private banks
propose net settlement only for a subset of types.) The supervisors only allow net settlement
if both banks are of a type lower or equal to e q2
1. The proposal made for types higher than
e q2
1 is thus irrelevant.
Denote the private threshold e qPR. Because there can be only one jump, there are only
two possible schemes that the private banks can agree upon. The …rst candidate scheme has







1 for qi · e qPR
e qPR for e qPR < qi · e q2
1






PR ¡ e q
2
1 (A.11)
where qPR is given by (5.1). It follows that a necessary condition for the scheme to exist
is e q2
1 < 2qPR. Consider now the public scheme. Suppose that the local bank is of the type
e q2
1. For the scheme to be incentive compatible, the supervisor has to be indi¤erent between
gross settlement and net settlement with the expected type 1














Solving (A.11) and (A.12) shows that because of Assumption 3, which implies (R ¡
1)L=R ·
1
2, there exist no solution satisfying e q2
1 < 2qPR The …rst candidate scheme does
32thus not exist.




e qPR for qi · e qPR
0 for qi > e qPR: .
The supervisors do not allow net settlement for qi > q2
1, where q2
1 is given by (A.7). The
private information exchange is therefore only relevant if e qPR < q2
1. The scheme has to be







PR) = 0 , e q
PR = 2q
PR.
However, straightforward calculations show that q2
1 < e qPR = 2qPR. The private banks can
thus not a¤ect the outcome of the game by playing the second candidate scheme.
The only thing left to show is that foreseeing the public regulation, the private banks
prefer to propose net settlement rather than gross settlement. The expected type of the






1 < qPR, the banks prefer
net settlement whenever it is allowed by the supervisor. It is thus optimal always to propose
net settlement, and the analysis in section 4 goes through. ¤
A.6. Proposition 5
We …rst show that there does not exist a scheme with two intervals as de…ned by Proposition
1. The private banks propose to settle on a net basis whenever q1;q2 · (R ¡ 1)L=R. Using
(A.7) it can be shown that (R ¡ 1)L=R < q2
1. Therefore, the two interval scheme does
not exist. It follows from Proposition 2 that there does not exist schemes with more than
two intervals. It is left to show that the supervisors accept the private proposal of a net
settlement system. The expected type of the foreign bank given that net settlement has
been proposed is
(R¡1)L














R+L, it is optimal to accept the private banks’ proposal. ¤
B. The Interest Rate
In a net settlement system, the customers receive 1 + r if the local bank does not fail. If is
does fail, the payment received by customers depends on whether the foreign bank fails or
not. If the foreign bank succeeds, the customers receive the reserves that the bank holds plus
ASO, r +t. If the foreign bank also fails, the customers are only paid r. In a net settlement




N (qi;qj) = (1 ¡ qi)(1 + r) + qi(1 ¡ qj)(r + t) + qiqjr:
Similarly, in a gross settlement system, the customers receive 1+ r if the bank succeeds,
and t + r if it fails. Hence, the expected payments are
PG(qi;qj) = (1 ¡ qi)(1 + r) + qi(t + r):
33The customers foresee for which (q1;q2) net settlement will be chosen in equilibrium.
They also know if partial or full contagion applies. Consider …rst a private system. The
interest rate that ensures the customers exactly zero return on the deposits is then the










































C. Optimal Reserve Holdings
Denote the amount of reserves held e t and the optimal amount of reserves t¤. The pro…ts in





(1 ¡ r ¡ e t ¡
t+r¡e t
L )R ¡ (1 ¡ t)
i
for e t < t+ r
(1 ¡ qi)
£
(1 ¡ r ¡ e t)R ¡ (1 ¡ e t)
¤
for e t ¸ t+ r
.
It is easy to verify that pro…ts are increasing in e t for e t · t + r, as the banks needs t+ r
reservesto settle payments and to pay CustomersA the promised interest rate. Hence, t¤ = t.
Consider next the net settlement system. It can be shown that it is never optimal to hold
less reserves than r, as reserves of r are needed to pay Customers A. Suppose therefore that
the bank holds e t ¸ r reserves. The pro…ts are:








(1 ¡ r ¡ e t)R ¡ 1 + e t¡ t
¤ª
:
Taking the derivative with respect to e t, we …nd
@¼N
@e t





















t + r else
(C.1)
34We want show that the private banks choose t = r in the region where a net settlement
system is implemented. Suppose …rst that private banks have perfect information about each





Hence, the banks choose t¤ = r.
Nowsuppose that the private banks have no informational advantage. Before the informa-
tion exchange, the expected type of the foreign bank given that there is net settlement system
is 1
2©n(qi). The supervisor could obtain gross settlement with certainty by signalling qi = 1.




After the information exchange, the supervisor knows the foreign bank’s type, but he cannot
pass this information on to the local bank. Hence, if net settlement is allowed, the local bank









it follows from (C.1) that the optimal reserve holding is t¤ = r.
Suppose instead that signals are non-binding, such that the supervisor only knows to
which interval the foreign bank belongs. If the supervisor allows net settlement with a bank






R . It follows that the private bank
chooses t¤ = r whether it knows that the foreign bank is in Iz or it just knows that net
settlement was approved by the supervisor. Hence, if signals are non-binding, it does not
change the portfolio choice if the supervisor leaks the information he has about the foreign
bank’s type to the local bank.
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